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Abstract
This paper formalizes the pervasive phenomenon of the self-serving bias
within the framework of reference dependent preferences. This formulation
allows the stating of a simple rule to assess the existence of the bias at the
aggregate level as well as a procedure that identies the minimum number
of biased agents. We apply the model to two standard situations: a litigation
between a plainti¤ and a defendant and a bankruptcy problem. In the litigation
case, we show how the combination of self-serving bias and reference dependent
preferences increases the likelihood that a dispute proceeds to trial. In the
bankruptcy case, we show how the existence of individuals with self-serving
biased reference points exacerbates the conict between equity and e¢ ciency of
the nal allocation.
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1 Introduction
Self-serving bias is a pervasive phenomenon that inuences individual behavior in a
variety of ways: people tend to overestimate their own merits and abilities, to favor-
ably acquire and interpret information, to give biased judgments about what is fair
and what is not, and to inate their claims and contributions.1 As such, self-serving
bias (from now on SSB) can have important social and economic implications. For
instance, it is considered as one of the main causes of costly impasses in bargaining
and negotiations (see Babcock et al., 1995 and Babcock and Loewenstein, 1997) as
well as a source of political instability (Heyndels and Ashworth, 2003). Moreover, it
has been argued that SSB increases the propensity to strike (Babcock et al., 1996),
the incidence of trials (Farmer and Pecorino, 2002), and the intensity of marital con-
icts (Schütz, 1999). Even if the importance of SSB is widely acknowledged in the
economic literature, a proper formalization of the concept, as well as the analytical
study of its implications, are still somehow scarce and case-specic. In this paper we
aim to introduce a more general theoretical framework for modeling and studying
the e¤ects of the bias. This framework combines SSB with the notion of reference
dependent preferences.
Reference dependent preferences (from now on RDP) explicitly acknowledge the
fact that an agents evaluation of a given outcome can be inuenced by comparing
it with a certain reference point. This intuition goes back to the loss aversion
conjecture introduced in the classical article by Kahneman and Tversky (1979) and
more recently modeled by Koszegi and Rabin (2006): people dene gains and losses
with respect to a reference point and losses loom larger than gains.
We postulate that SSB a¤ects agentsreference points in a trivial but systematic
1Research in psychology and sociology provides many convincing examples for the existence of
such a bias. For instance, Svenson (1981) reports that the overwhelming majority of subjects (93%)
feel they drive better than the average while Ross and Sicoly (1979) show how, within married
couples, the sum of the two self-assessed personal contributions to various household tasks usually
exceeds 100%.
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way. We claim in fact that, everything else being equal, a self-serving biased agent
will have the tendency to set a reference point that is higher then the one his unbiased
counterpart would set. This consideration leads to a simple rule for assessing the
existence of SSB at the aggregate level: whenever agentsreference points are not
mutually compatible (i.e., their sum exceeds the surplus available in the transaction)
then one can conclude that at least some of the players are self-serving biased. By
recursively applying this rule to progressively smaller sets of agents, we are also able
to put a lower bound on the number of biased individuals.
We investigate the implications of the proposed framework in two common situ-
ations where SSB is (very) likely to play a role: a litigation between two parties and
a bankruptcy problem.2 In the rst case, we model the choices of a plainti¤ and a
defendant who can either settle their dispute out of court or proceed to a costly trial.
This is a major topic as a noticeable percentage of litigations reach the courtroom
with obvious costs for the contendants as well as for the e¢ ciency and speed of the
legal system.3 Shavell (1982) and Bebchuk (1984) have been the rst to show how
wrong beliefs (and in particular optimistic beliefs) about the likelihood of prevailing
at trial reduce the space for settlements and make trials more likely. More recently,
Farmer and Pecorino (2002) have explicitly analyzed the role of the self-serving bias
in litigations. In their formulation, SSB takes the form of a multiplicative bias that
inates (for the plainti¤) or deates (for the defendant) the objective probability
that the judge will decide in favor of the plainti¤. Despite some peculiar situations,
the authors nd that usually a larger SSB increases the incidence of trials. Bar-Gill
(2005) studies instead the evolutionary properties of optimistic beliefs (but argues
that the analysis also applies to other cognitive biases such as the SSB) and shows
2As such, the paper also contributes to the growing literature about behavioral welfare economics
(see Bernheim and Rangel, 2007, for a recent review) that studies the welfare/policy implications
of behavioral models vis-à-vis traditional models.
3 In general, around 10% of legal disputes are litigated in a trial (Bar-Gill, 2005). However, in
the case of medical malpractice lawsuits this gure climbs up to 39% (Studdert et al., 2006).
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that this bias is evolutionary stable as it makes a party more succesfull in extracting
more favorable settlements. Building on these papers, we show how the combination
of SSB and RDP conrms the detrimental role that the bias has in the chances of
reaching a settlement out of the court but, perhaps surprisingly, does not further
amplify it.
The second application that we investigate is a classical bankruptcy problem
(see Thomson, 2003, for a recent review about the vast literature on the topic),
i.e., the problem of optimally allocating a scarce resource among a nite number
of claimants. We show that whenever at least some of the claimants display SSB
then the allocation that matches each agents reference point is unfeasible. The
planner is thus forced to disappoint at least some of the claimants and this raises
a number of interesting questions. Shall the planner disappoint (a little) all the
claimants? Or shall he match the expectations of a few while disappointing (a
lot) the remaining ones? If so, who shall the planner favor? We investigate these
issues under di¤erent social welfare specications and show how the combination of
SSB and RDP exacerbates the trade-o¤ between equity and e¢ ciency of the nal
allocation.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces a model of self-serving
biased reference points and presents some general results. Section 3 applies the pro-
posed model to a litigation problem. Section 4 investigates a bankruptcy problem.
Section 5 concludes.
2 Reference dependent preferences and self-serving bias
Koszegi and Rabin (2006) introduced the following analytical formulation of refer-
ence dependent preferences:
u(x; r) = m(x) + (m(x) m(r))
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The increasing function m() captures the direct e¤ect that the possession or
consumption of good x has on total utility u(). The function () is a universal
gain-loss function. Given the reference point r, () reects the additional e¤ects
that perceived gains or losses have on u(). More precisely, and in line with the orig-
inal prospect theory formulation of Kahneman and Tversky (1979), () is assumed
to satisfy the following properties:
P1: (z) is continuous for all z, strictly increasing and such that (0) = 0.
P2: (z) is twice di¤erentiable for z 6= 0.
P3: 00(z) > 0 if z < 0 and 00(z) < 0 if z > 0.
P4: if y > z > 0 then (y) + ( y) < (z) + ( z).
P5: limz!0  0(z)= limz!0+ 0(z)   > 1.
Therefore the function () is convex for values of x that are below r (domain
of losses) and concave for values of x that are above r (domain of gains). Property
P3 also implies that the marginal inuence of these perceived gains and losses is
decreasing.4 P4 means that for large absolute values of z the function () is more
sensitive to losses than to gains. P5 implies the same result for small values of z:
() is steeper approaching the reference point from the left (losses) rather than from
the right (gains). Taken together, these last two properties capture the loss aversion
phenomenon.
On the other hand, the ve properties are silent about how an individual sets his
reference point r. This is clearly a problematic issue to tackle given the subjective
nature of such a choice. Di¤erent individuals can set di¤erent reference points ac-
cording to what they have (as in the traditional status quo formulation of Kahneman
4 In the two applications that we will later consider (Section 3 and Section 4) we will actually
work with linear functions that do not capture diminishing sensitivity but still provide an adequate,
and much more tractable, characterization of RDP. In those contexts property P3 will thus be
substituted by property P30: For all z, 00(z) = 0. This alternative property is also mutuated from
Koszegi and Rabin (2006, see property A30, page 1140).
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and Tversky, 1979), to what they expect (as proposed in Koszegi and Rabin, 2006)
or to what they think they deserve, just to name a few possibilities.
No matter the specic features of this introspective process, we argue that the
self-serving bias a¤ects in a systematic way the reference point the agent set. Bab-
cock and Loewenstein (1997, p. 110) dene SSB as a tendency to conate what is
fair with what benets oneself. In line with this denition, we claim that, every-
thing else being equal, a biased agent will set a higher reference point with respect
to his hypothetical unbiased counterpart, i.e., r(biased) > r(unbiased). This simple
consideration implies that SSB has a negative e¤ect on individual utility. In fact,
a biased reference point leads to either smaller perceived gains or larger perceived
losses. The following lemma claries this point.
Lemma 1 For any given x, u(x; r(biased)) < u(x; r(unbiased)).
Proof. Property P1 and the fact that m() is an increasing function imply that
() is decreasing in r. Given the assumption r(biased) > r(unbiased), this implies
that, for any given x, (m(x) m(r(biased))) < (m(x) m(r(unbiased))). Therefore,
u(x; r(biased)) < u(x; r(unbiased)).
Now consider all those situations in which n  2 agents have preferences that
can be captured by RDP and that are dened on all the possible allocations of
a given surplus of size S 2 R. The cases in which the surplus available in the
problem under scrutiny is negative (perhaps because of the existence of some kind
of transaction costs) are then captured by setting S < 0. A classical example is a
costly trial between a plainti¤ and a defendant in a suit for damages. The case with
S = 0 mimics a zero-sum game of pure transfers among the agents. The case with
S > 0 captures instead all the situations in which a positive surplus must be shared
among di¤erent claimants. Examples include bankruptcy and bargaining problems,
principal-agent relations and lobbying.
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Let the utility function of agent i 2 f1; :::; ng be ui(xi; ri) = m(xi) + (m(xi) 
m(ri)).5 Now imagine that agents have reference points that are not self-serving
biased. Almost tautologically, unbiased reference points should be mutually com-
patible. This means that the sum of these reference points should be equal to the
available surplus, i.e.,
P
i ri(unbiased) = S. The framework of unbiased reference
points provides a benchmark that can be used to assess the existence of agents that
are self-serving biased.
Denition 1 If
P
i ri > S then at least some of the agents are self-serving biased.
Notice that Denition 1 allows the identication of the existence of SSB only at
the aggregate level. For instance, in the case with S > 0, we did not dene SSB
at the individual level with the condition ri > Sn . In fact, it could well be the case
that an agent sets ri > Sn without being biased but simply because he objectively
deserves more than others. However, if claims are not compatible (i.e., if
P
i ri > S)
then SSB surely inates the reference point of some of the players.6 By recursively
applying Denition 1 to progressively smaller sets of agents, it is possible to set a
lower bound on the number of biased individuals.
Proposition 1 Given n  2 agents and their reference points ri where, without loss
of generality, r1  r2  :::  rn, then the number of self-serving biased agents is at
least n  k + 1 where k is such that Pki=1 ri > S and Pk 1i=1 ri  S.
Proof. Consider the set N = f1; :::; ng and, without loss of generality, let r1  r2 
:::  rn. If
Pn
i=1 ri > S, then, by Denition 1, at least one player is biased. Imagine
that agent n is the only biased agent. Moreover, imagine that his bias is extreme,
5Notice that this specication allows for heterogeneity in agentsreference points but assumes
that the functions m() and () are the same across individuals.
6We do not consider the situation of
P
i ri < S as this would imply that some agents display a
self-defeating bias, an hypothesis whose empirical support is much weaker.
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i.e., rn(unbiased) = 0. Now consider the set Nn fng = f1; :::; n  1g. If
Pn 1
i=1 ri > S
then, again by Denition 1, there must be at least another biased agent. Remove
agent n  1 and apply the same procedure. The process is iterated until one reaches
the set Nn fk; :::; ng = f1; :::; k   1g with Pki=1 ri > S and Pk 1i=1 ri  S. This is
the largest possible set that is consistent with the hypothesis of unbiased agents. It
follows that n   k + 1 is the minimum number of self-serving biased agents within
the original set N .
Example 1 Consider two hypothetical situations with n = 4 and S = 1. In the
rst one, let r1 = 0:2, r2 = 0:3, r3 = 0:3 and r4 = 0:5 such that
P4
i=1 ri = 1:3.
Given that
P3
i=1 ri < 1, we have that k = 4 and n   k + 1 = 1. Therefore, we can
only conclude that there is at least one biased claimant. In the alternative scenario,
let r1 = 0:4, r2 = 0:7, r3 = 0:8 and r4 = 0:9 such that
P4
i=1 ri = 2:8. Given thatP2
i=1 ri > 1 and
P1
i=1 ri < 1, we have that k = 2 and n   k + 1 = 3. Therefore,
there are at least three biased agents.
3 An application to a litigation problem
In this section we apply the framework of RDP and SSB to a standard litigation
problem. We want to investigate which are the implications of the proposed model
for what concerns agentsdecision to proceed to a costly trial versus a settlement out
of court. In particular, we compare the results of the model (subsection 3.3) with
two benchmark situations: the case in which litigants have perfect information and
rational preferences (subsection 3.1) and the case in which litigants have self-serving
biased beliefs but, other than that, still standard rational preferences (subsection
3.2).
The general structure of our analysis follows the one introduced in Shavell (1982)
and more recently used by Bar-Gill (2005). As such, we model a litigation as a game
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between two risk-neutral players: a plainti¤ (p) and a defendant (d). The plainti¤
moves rst and must decide if to sue the defendant. In case of suit, then the two
players can either agree on a certain settlement or proceed to court. Let cp, cd > 0
be the costs that the two players must bear if the case goes to trial and C = cp+ cd
the sum of these legal costs,7 q 2 (0; 1) the true probability of a judgement in favor
of the plainti¤, and W > 0 the true reimbursement the defendant must pay the
plainti¤ in case the latter wins the trial. We assume that qW   cp > 0 such that the
expected value of the trial for the plainti¤.
3.1 The case with perfect information
If both players know q and W with certainty, the plainti¤ always sues the defen-
dant and then the two agents always agree on a settlement where the defendant
pays the plainti¤ an amount qW . Agents expected payo¤s are in fact given by
E(up=suit; settlement) = qW and E(ud=settlement) =  qW that strictly dominate
the expected payo¤s that would follow a trial, namely E(up=suit; trial) = qW   cp
and E(ud=trial) =  qW  cd. It follows that if information was perfect trials should
never be observed.
3.2 The case with self-serving bias
A necessary condition for a litigation to proceed to trial is thus that at least one
of the two parties does not possess perfect information and displays some sort of
bias in his beliefs about the unknown parameters of the model. In this section, we
assume that litigants do not know the true W and that their subjective ex-ante
assessment Wi with i 2 fp; dg can be inuenced by the self-serving bias.8 More
7We analyze the situation under the so-called American rule according to which each contendant
bears his own legal costs no matter the result of the trial.
8Notice that this is a slightly di¤erent approach with respect to how Shavell (1982) and Bar-Gill
(2005) model optimistic beliefs (see also Langlais, 2008). In fact in these papers agents do not
know the true q and optimism inuences qi, the perceived probability of a judgement in favor of the
plainti¤. In our model agents do not know W and SSB a¤ects Wi, the perceived reimbursement
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precisely, Wp = Wd = W if both agents are unbiased. On the other hand, Wp > W
if the plainti¤ is biased while W > Wd if the defendant is biased. Expected payo¤s
are thus given by:
Expected utility of the plainti¤ p:
8<: E(up=suit; trial) = qWp   cpE(up=suit; settlement) = qWp cp+qWd+cd2
Expected utility of the defendant d:
8<: E(ud=trial) =  qWd   cdE(ud=settlement) =   qWp cp+qWd+cd2
Where, in line with Bar-Gill (2005), we have assumed that in a settlement the
defendant pays the plainti¤ an amount qWp cp+j qWd cdj2 . This amount corresponds
to the mean of the two reservation prices (i.e., the expected payo¤s in case of trial).9
The analysis of the payo¤s conrms a well-known result (Shavell, 1982, Bar-Gill,
2005): the litigation proceeds to trial if and only if the condition
qWp   cp > qWd + cd (1)
holds. On the other hand, settlement thus occurs whenever qWp   cp  qWd + cd.
Condition 1 also allows to determine the maximum level of legal costs ci with
i 2 fp; dg for which agent i still prefers to proceed to trial. More precisely, agent i
proceeds to trial whenever ci < c^i where c^i = qWp   qWd   cj with j 2 fp; dg and
j 6= i.10 We will compare these thresholds with those that emerge in a situation
where SSB is modeled within RDP.
the defendant must pay if the plainti¤ wins the trial. While the analytical implications of the
two approaches are basically the same (what matters are expected payo¤s), we think that our
characterization better matches the denition of SSB as a bias that inates how much an agent
thinks he deserves (and similarly their approach better describes optimism, i.e., a bias that leads
agents to overestimate their probability to win).
9 In other words, we imagine a situation in which the two players announce their reservation
prices and then bargain with equal bargaining power such that they settle on the mean value.
10This formulation conrms the standard result according to which Under the American system,
there will be a trial if and only if the plainti¤ s estimate of the expected judgment exceeds the
defendants estimate by at least the sum of their legal costs(Shavell, 1982, page 63). In fact, trial
occurs if and only if ci < c^i, i.e., ci < qWp   qWd   cj for some i 2 fp; dg and j 6= i. It follows that
trial occurs if and only if qWp   qWd > ci + cj .
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3.3 The case with self-serving biased reference points
Now let the two litigants display reference dependent preferences à la Koszegi and
Rabin (2006), i.e., ui(xi; ri) = xi + (xi   ri) where xi is the monetary transfer
that agent i 2 fp; dg receives/pays and ri is his ex-ante reference point.11 In such
a context reference points are naturally given by players expectations about the
outcome of the trial. More precisely, rp = qWp   cp > 0 and rd =  qWd   cd < 0
where, as in the previous section, Wp  W  Wd with strict inequalities if agents
are self-serving biased.
Notice moreover that the surplus available in the transaction is negative. In
fact, while the amount of money that the defendant pays to the plainti¤ is a simple
monetary transfer between the two agents, the legal costs that agents incur in case
of a trial are dissipated. Therefore, using the notation introduced in Section 2, we
have S < 0 and in particular S =  C where C = cp + cd. In line with Denition
1, we thus observe that rp + rd = S if both agents are unbiased while rp + rd > S
whenever at least one of the two agents displays a self-serving biased reference point.
We can also express the proposed settlement identied in Subsection 3.2 in terms
of the reference points given that qWp cp+qWd+cd2 =
rp rd
2 . The condition that leads
to trial (qWp   cp > qWd + cd, see condition (1) in the previous subsection) can be
reformulated as rp > jrdj. It follows that settlement occurs if and only if rp  jrdj.
Agentsexpected payo¤s are given by:12
Expected utility of the plainti¤p:
8<: E(up=suit; trial) = rpE(up=suit; settlement) = rp rd2 +  rp rd2 
11Notice that with respect to the more general formulation introduced in Section 2 (i.e.,
ui(xi; ri) = m(xi) + (m(xi)  m(ri))), here we are assuming that the function m() is such that
m(x) = x for any x 2 R. This assumption is made for the sake of tractability but it does not
undermine the general results.
12More precisely E(up=trial) = rp + (rp   rp) = rp because (0) = 0 given property P1 of the
function . And E(up=settlement) =
rp rd
2
+ 

rp rd
2
  rp

which becomes E(up=settlement) =
rp rd
2
+ 
 rp rd
2

. Same simplications apply to the defendants payo¤s.
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Expected utility of the defendant d:
8<: E(ud=trial) = rdE(ud=settlement) =   rp rd2 +  rp rd2 
The game with unbiased agents (i.e., Wp =Wd =W and rp + rd = S) simplies
to the situation analyzed in Section 3.1 such that litigants always agree on the
settlement qW .
On the other hand, whenever at least one of the agents is biased, the two reference
points are no more compatible (rp + rd > S) and thus, depending on the size of the
legal costs, the option to proceed to trial can be characterized by a higher expected
payo¤. The following proposition shows a surprising result: while a model of self-
serving biased reference points clearly increases the incidence of trials with respect
to the case in which agents are unbiased and have perfect information (Subsection
3.1), it does not further increase the likelihood of trials in comparison with the case
in which only SSB, but not RDP, is present (Subsection 3.2).
Proposition 2 If agents display reference dependent preferences and at least one
of them has a self-serving biased reference point, then a litigation proceeds to trial
whenever legal costs of at least one player are below the threshold ~ci = c^i 
 rp rd
2

with i 2 fp; dg and where c^i = qWp  qWd  cj, with j 6= i, is the threshold if agents
had no RDP.
Proof. The condition that makes the plainti¤ prefer the trial with respect to the
settlement is given by E(up=suit; trial) > E(up=suit; settlement), i.e., rp >
rp rd
2 +

 rp rd
2

. This inequality holds for any cp < ~cp where ~cp = qWp   qWd   cd  

 rp rd
2

. Similarly, the defendant prefers the trial if and only if E(ud=trial) >
E(ud=settlement), i.e., rd >   rp rd2 +
 rp rd
2

which holds for any cd < ~cd where
~cd = qWp qWd cp 
 rp rd
2

. Therefore, for any i 2 fp; dg, ~ci = c^i 
 rp rd
2

where c^i is the threshold if agents had no RDP. Focusing on the last term, and given
property P1 of the () function, we have that
h
 
 rp rd
2
i
> 0 whenever rp > jrdj
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while
h
 
 rp rd
2
i
 0 whenever rp  jrdj. As such, ~ci > c^i if rp > jrdj and ~ci  c^i
if rp  jrdj.
Notice therefore that the combination of RDP and SSB does not modify the
decision of the litigants if to proceed to trial or settle. In fact, if rp > jrdj then
ci < c^i < ~ci and agent i prefers to go in front of the judge both with (this subsection)
and without (Subsection 3.2) RDP. At the opposite, if rp  jrdj then ci  c^i  ~ci and
agent i prefers to settle both with and without RDP. The intuition for this result is
that litigants with RDP compare the proposed settlement with their reference point
(the expected payo¤ of the trial). The additional disutility (respectively utility) that
agents get from this comparison makes less binding the critical level of legal costs
below (resp. above) which the trial (resp. settlement) is preferred. In other words,
if legal costs of agent i are below the threshold without RDP (c^i) then a fortiori
they are below the threshold with RDP (~ci). See the example below. While, at the
opposite, if ci is above c^i then a fortiori ci is above ~ci.
Example 2 Let q = 0:5, W = 100, Wp = 120, Wd = 90, cp = 8 and cd = 3. And if
litigants have RDP assume also that m(x) = x and that the function () is linear
with (x) = x for x < 0 and (x) = 12x if x  0. Then rp = 52 and rd =  42 such
that the proposed settlement is given by 52 ( 42)2 = 47. Thresholds for legal costs are
given by c^p = 12 and c^d = 7 if litigants had no RDP, and by ~cp = c^p ( 5) = 17 and
~cd = c^d   ( 5) = 12 if litigants had RDP. Given that cp < c^p < ~cp and cd < c^d < ~cd
then both the plainti¤ and the defendant choose to procede to trial no matter if they
have RDP or not.
4 An application to a bankruptcy problem
Consider the problem of a social planner who must allocate a homogeneous and
perfectly divisible good (whose amount we normalize to S = 1) among n  2
13
claimants.13 Let N = f1; :::; ng denote the set of claimants. The notation x =
(x1; :::; xn) indicates a possible allocation such that xi is the amount of the good
that the planner assigns to claimant i 2 N . Feasible allocations are the ones for
which xi 2 [0; 1] for any i and
P
i xi  1. The vector u = (u1; :::; un) with ui = ui(xi)
collects individual utilities.
The social planner wants to maximize social welfare. His objective function is
given by a social welfare function (SWF) W (u) that aggregates individualsutilities
into social utilities. We assume that the social planner is not biased towards any
particular claimant and therefore we only consider symmetric SWFs that give equal
weight to every agent. More precisely, we consider two classical welfare functions:
the utilitarian SWF (Bentham, 1789) dened as Wut (u) =
P
i ui and the maxmin
SWF (Rawls, 1971) dened as Wmm (u) = min fu1; :::; ung. We will indicate an
optimal allocation with the vector x^w = (x^w1 ; :::; x^
w
n ) where x^w = argmaxWw(u)
and w 2 fut;mmg.
4.1 The case with rational preferences
Traditional neoclassical analysis postulates agents have preferences that lead to con-
tinuous, increasing, and concave utility functions. If claimants are endowed with
preferences of this kind, the utilitarian SWF selects x^ut such that u0i(x^
ut
i ) = u
0
j(x^
ut
j )
for any i; j 2 N . In fact, the function Wut(u) is concave (it is the sum of n concave
functions) and it is thus maximized by the allocation that equalizes agentsmar-
ginal utility. If, on the other hand, the social planner adopts the maxmin SWF, the
optimal allocation is the one that equalizes individualsactual utility, i.e., x^mm is
such that ui (x^mmi ) = uj

x^mmj

for any i; j 2 N . Alternatively, another common
13Countless are the possible examples for such a situation: a parent who wants to divide a
chocolate bar among her children, a boss who must share a monetary bonus among his subordinates,
a judge called to decide how to divide the belongings of a divorcing couple, an organization that
must allocate humanitarian aid to di¤erent villages hit by a natural disaster.
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formulation of rational utility functions is the linear one.14 In this case, x^ut is such
that x^uti = 1 for the i (assumed to be unique) with u
0
i > u
0
j for any j 6= i and x^mm
is such that ui (x^mmi ) = uj

x^mmj

for any i; j 2 N .
4.2 The case with self-serving biased reference points
With respect to the rational formulation, RDP seem better suited to model the
preferences of claimants involved in an allocation problem. This is, in fact, a typical
situation in which a claimants utility, although mainly depending on the amount
of resource that the agent gets, is usually also a¤ected by comparisons between the
actual allocation and the expected one (i.e., the reference point). And, as already
discussed, reference points are in turn likely to be a¤ected by the self-serving bias.15
Let claimants have preferences à la Koszegi and Rabin (2006), i.e., ui(xi; ri) =
m(xi) + (m(xi)  m(ri)). As in Section 3, here we assume again that m(xi) = xi
such that ui(xi; ri) = xi + (xi   ri). In the context of a bankruptcy problem this
assumption proves to be very useful as the linear form of m() implies that the
properties of the function () directly translate into equivalent properties of the
utility function ui().16 Finally, let
P
i ri > 1 such that, in line with Denition 1, at
least some of the claimants have self-serving biased reference points. The planner
knows the vector r = (r1; :::; rn) but he does not know the size of individual biases
so that he cannot correct for them.
In such a situation, utilitarian SWF is given by Wut = 1+
P
i (xi  ri). Notice
that the function Wut is not guaranteed to be concave. In fact, the allocation
x = (r1; :::; rn) is unfeasible and the planner is forced to disappoint at least some
of the claimants, i.e., he must allocate xi < ri to some i 2 N . This implies that
14This formulation can be considered as an approximation of a concave function for the cases in
which the admissible range of xi is small enough to make the marginal decreases in utility negligible.
Because of this, linear utility functions are often implicitly assumed in many low stakes experimental
studies about strategic interactions (bargaining games, ultimatum games, dictator games).
15 In such a context, reference points can be seen as claims on shares of the total amount S.
16See Proposition 2 in Koszegi and Rabin (2006) for a formal statement and proof of this result.
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some of the (xi   ri) functions are convex. Nevertheless, it is easy to prove that
the optimal utilitarian allocation cannot be such that xi < ri for all i.
Proposition 3 The optimal utilitarian allocation x^ut = (x^ut1 ; :::; x^
ut
n ) is such that
x^uti  ri for some i 2 N .
Proof. By contradiction. Assume x^ut is such that x^uti < ri for all i. Property P3
of the function () states that 00i (x^uti ) > 0 such that, given the linear form of m(),
the functions ui are convex at x^uti . Therefore the function Wut is also convex. This
implies that x^ut cannot be a maximum because it fails the second order necessary
condition.
In terms of utilitarian welfare, any allocation such that xi < ri for all i (like
for instance the famous proportional rule that assigns xi = ri=

ri +
P
j 6=i rj

) is
thus ine¢ cient. In particular, these allocations are dominated by any allocation
that matches the reference points of some agents and leaves the others as residual
claimants. In other words, it is more e¢ cient to satisfy some agents and disappoint
a lot the remaining ones rather than to disappoint a little all of them. The question
is then how to decide who are the agents to disappoint and by how much. The
following proposition addresses this point.
Proposition 4 Assume that the constraint xi  ri for any i 2 N must hold and,
without loss of generality, order the claimants such that r1  r2  :::  rn. Then the
allocation x^ut = (x^ut1 ; :::; x^
ut
n ) with x^
ut
i = min
n
ri;max
n
1 Pj<i rj ; 0oo is optimal.
Proof. The planners problem is given by maxWut = 1 +
P
i (xi   ri). This
is equivalent to min
P
i (xi   ri) given that xi  ri must hold and therefore, by
property P1, the functions () are non positive. Moreover, property P3 ensures that
() exhibits diminishing marginal sensitivity such that (a)+(b) < (0)+(a+b)
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for any a; b < 0. This implies that the planner must allocate xi = ri to as many
agents as possible (i.e., starting from those with the lowest ri) while disappointing
as much as possible the claimants that can be disappointed the most. The allocation
rule x^uti = min
n
ri;max
n
1 Pj<i rj ; 0oo fullls this goal.
The optimal allocation x^uti identied by Proposition 4 is unique whenever rn 1 <Pn
i=1 ri 1  rn. If this condition does not hold then there could be multiple optimal
allocations. Still, x^uti always belongs to the set of optimal solutions.
Example 3 Consider two hypothetical situations with n = 4. In the rst one let
r1 = 0:1, r2 = 0:3, r3 = 0:5 and r4 = 0:7. Given that r3 <
P
i ri 1  r4, Proposition
4 identies the unique optimal solution x^ut = (0:1; 0:3; 0:5; 0:1). In the alternative
scenario let r1 = 0:1, r2 = 0:2, r3 = 0:5 and r4 = 0:6. Given that the condition
r3 <
P
i ri 1  r4 does not hold, there are multiple optimal allocations. Proposition
4 identies x^ut = (0:1; 0:2; 0:5; 0:2). But also the allocation x^0ut = (0:1; 0:2; 0:1; 0:6)
achieves the maximal welfare Wut = 1 + ( 0:4).17
Proposition 4 provides the solution to the problem when the condition xi  ri
must hold for all i. Relaxing this constraint, can it be welfare enhancing to allocate
xi > ri to some of the agents? The answer to this question clearly depends on
the specic shape of claimantsutility functions. In particular, starting from the
allocation x^ut identied by Proposition 4, the answer can be positive if and only if
the decrease in welfare associated with further disappointing the residual claimant
~{ (in both scenarios of Example 3 this would be agent 4) by allocating him x^ut~{   
with x^ut~{ = 1 
P~{ 1
j=1 rj   > 0 is more than compensated by the increase stemming
from redistributing  among the claimants i = f1; :::;~{  1g. Formally, if and only
if the condition (~{   1)


~{ 1

>   (x^ut~{     r~{)  (x^ut~{   r~{) holds. If this is
17Notice anyway that a social planner with lexicographic preferences dened over utilitarian
welfare and equality would strictly prefer the allocation x^ut over x^0ut.
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the case, then these unconstrained optimal allocations are identied by rst- and
second-order conditions or they emerge as a corner solution.
In any case, utilitarian welfare is surely smaller than 1. Utilitarian welfare would
be larger (Wut = 1) if the social planner could match all claims, i.e., if agents were
unbiased and
P
i ri = 1. In other words, self-serving bias is welfare detrimental not
only at the individual level (see Lemma 1) but also at the aggregate level.
Consider now what happens if the social planner adopts the maxmin SWF. This
function selects the allocation at which utility functions intersect. Given the shape
of agentsutility functions and the hypothesis of SSB, such a condition, if feasible,
will usually arise in the interval where xi < ri for all i. This implies that in general
the optimal maxmin allocation is ine¢ cient from a utilitarian point of view. The
following case is particularly striking:
Proposition 5 If
P
i ri > 1 and ri = r for all i then x^mm =
 
1
n ; :::;
1
n

= argminWut.
Proof. If ri = r for all i then claimants are perfectly symmetric and the only
feasible and Pareto e¢ cient allocation that equalizes their utility is the egalitarian
one. It follows that x^mm =
 
1
n ; :::;
1
n

. Symmetry also implies that this is the unique
allocation for which the FOCs of maxWut are satised and
P
i xi = 1 holds. But
given that xi < ri for all i the functions ui are convex and so is Wut. Therefore,
x^mm coincides with the minimum of the utilitarian SWF.
When claimants are perfectly symmetric, the maxmin SWF supports the egal-
itarian allocation. Indeed, possibly also because of its ethical appeal (in line with
Aristotles celebrated prescription that equals should be treated equally), this is
certainly the most common solution implemented in reality. Still, Proposition 5
shows that such a choice implies a high e¢ ciency cost. In fact, the egalitarian allo-
cation happens to be the worst possible outcome from a utilitarian point of view.
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5 Conclusion
We proposed a framework that allows to explicitly model the self-serving bias. In
particular, we introduced self-serving bias within the family of reference dependent
preferences by claiming that the bias systematically inates agentsreference points.
This consideration provides a simple rule to assess the existence of the bias at the
aggregate level as well as a procedure to set a lower bound on the number of biased
agents. We applied the model to two standard situations: a litigation between a
plainti¤ and a defendant and a bankruptcy problem. In the rst case, the proposed
model essentially conrms the detrimental role that the self-serving bias has on the
probability of solving a dispute through a settlement rather then through a trial.
In the second situation, the model of self-serving biased reference points amplies
instead the trade-o¤ between the e¢ ciency and the equity of the nal allocation.
Despite some obvious limitations, we feel that the proposed formulation provides
a simple but fruitful way to formally analyze the consequences of the self-serving bias,
captures the main ingredients of many real-life problems and, generally, contributes
to the recent literature regarding public policy implications of research in behavioral
economics.
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